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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a sexual harassment case, which was initially brought pursuant to Title LX of the 
Federal Civil Rights Act, the Idaho Human Rights Act ("IBRA"), and pursuant to the State 
common-law tort claims of Negiigent Supervision, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Battery, and Assault (hereinafter "Tort Claims"), 
arising out of the acts of one Donald Friis, a professor at North Idaho College, from whom the 
Appellant began to take an introductory computer course on two occasions. See Amended 
Complaint, Record (R. ) at 76 Following various procedural stages both in the Idaho District 
Court, United States District Court for the District of Idaho, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, (set forth in greater detail below), the remaining operative theory of liability, and the 
statute which is before this Court, is Appellant's claim pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5901, et seq .. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
This matter has a fairly lengthy procedural history both in the State and Federal Court 
systems. Appellant initially filed her claim State Court, in the District Court of the First Judicial 
District, in and for the County of Kootenai (hereinafter "State Court"), Case No. 06-7150, on 
September 26, 2006. On October 31, 2006, Respondents sought Removal to Federal District 
Court. On or about November 2, 2006, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1 ), on the grounds that Appellant failed to comply with 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code section 6-906, regarding the state lav; tort claims. Said 
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Nfotion was granted, on March 23, 2007, without oral argument. Memorandum Order, R. at 88-
91. 
Subsequently, both Respondents sought Summary Judgment upon Appellant's remaining 
claims, on the grounds, inter alia, that: (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact that 
Respondent North Idaho College (hereinafter "NIC") was aware of, and deliberately indifferent 
to, Respondent Friis' inappropriate behavior; and (2), Respondent Friis was not liable under Title 
IX as an individual for said behavior. The Motions were heard by United States District 
Magistrate Candy W. Dale on June 17, 2008, and a Report and Recommendation was issued 
recommending that the ~fotions be Granted, on August 8, 2008. R. at 128--50. The Federal 
District Court approved the Repo1i and Recommendation on August 28, 2008, resulting in a final 
judgment of Dismissal on that date. See Order Adopting Report and Recommendation. R. at 
151 -52; and Judgment. This final judgment was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter "Ninth Circuit"), which affirmed the Federal District Court 
decision on the Title IX and Tort Claims, but reversed and remanded on the Idaho Human Rights 
Act Claim. See Memorandum, R. at 154-58. Subsequently, on remand, the Federal District 
Court, in turn, remanded the issue back to State Court. See Report and RecoIT,rnendation, 160-
62; Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, R. at 164. 
Following remand, Respondent >forth Idaho College (hereinafter "NIC") renevYed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 188-219. The renewed Motion was heard by the Idaho 
District Court, and initially denied. R. at 274--82. However, the Court subsequently granted 
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Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, and, as such, granted its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. at 316-17. It is from this Judgment that the instant Appeal is taken. 
r 
'--'• Concise Statement of the Facts 
The sexual harassment in question first began in 2001, when Ms. Johnson enrolled in an 
introductory computer class at NIC taught by Friis, at the suggestion of her academic advisor. R. 
at 234~37. During this time, Friis almost immediately began to act inappropriately toward ~vls. 
Johnson. Mr. Friis' actions included flinatious behavior, constantly asking Ms. Johnson to date 
him, in addition to yelling, humiliation, and other degrading treatment. Id. Throughout, Friis, 
indicated that her grade could be affected by her response to his actions. This behavior 
continued, until she was forced to withdraw from the course prior to the conclusion of the 
semester. It should be noted that none of the male students were treated in this manner. Id. 
Ms. Johnson continued at ?--i1C, and was again mformed, in 2004, that she should take the 
introductory computer course. Id. \Vhen she inquired as to who would be teaching the course, 
she was inforn1ed that it would be Donald Friis. She then asked whether she would be able to 
take the course from another instructor, to which she was informed that the only section available 
was that taught by Friis. Reluctantly, she enrolled in the course, with the hope that, on this 
occasion, Friis' behavior would have improved. Id. 
However, Respondent Friis' behavior did not improve, and, in fact, began to escalate. ln 
addition to the same harassment she experienced in 2001, Friis began to call her at home, and 
leave repeated messages upon her answering machine. Id. Due to Friis' harassment, Ms. 
Johnson was afraid to approach him regarding her course-work, as well as other aspects of the 
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subject-matter of the class, and the emotional distress she suffered as a result this treatment 
caused her to suffer academically in all aspects. Id. Eventually, she was again unable to 
complete the course, and received an "incomplete." Id. Due to the fact that Friis made it all but 
impossible for Ms. Johnson to continue to work with him, the incomplete was converted to an 
"F," resulting in her failure of the course. Id. 
ultimately, Ms. Johnson made a formal complaint with NIC for sexual harassment, 
despite the fact that her earlier accounts to staff members resulted in no action being taken. Id. 
After the Sexual Harassment committee concluded its investigation, it determined that Friis had, 
in fact, committed sexual harassment, and forced Friis to resign frorn his position at NIC. It is 
upon this that Respondent NIC bases its defense in this action. [Iowever, \1s. Johnson has 
learned that Friis had a long-standing reputation as a "campL1s lech," and that in fact, other 
female students have been subject to similar harassment at the hands of Respondent Friis. Yet, 
NIC failed to act up until that point, in spite of its long-standing knowledge of Friis' behavior 
and reputation. R. at 231-32 . Therefore, NIC remains liable under the Idaho Human Rights Act 
for the actions of its employee. 
Eventually, Ms. Johnson was able to complete Introduction to Computers, from a 
different instructor, with a decent grade, and has recently graduated from NIC with her 
associate's degree. However, her damages remain, and will likely remain for many years 
following this incident. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant presents the following Issues on Appeal: 
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A. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Respondents on the 
grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus entitling them to a judgment as a 
matter of law with regard to their affirmative defenses raised to Appellant's claims? 
B. Did the District Court err in granting Respondent North Idaho College's Motion 
for Reconsideration? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a grant of Summary Judgment de nova. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). A Motion for Reconsideration is reviewed pursuant 
to an abuse of discretion standard. Antim v. Fred lvfeyer Stores, Inc., 251 P.3d 602,610 (2011). 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summarv Judgment on Appellant's 
Idaho Human Rights Act Claim. 
1. Standard for Summarv Judgment. 
In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Respondents are "entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to 
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record 
in favor o[the nonmoving partv, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor 
of the nonmoving partv." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) 
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(emphasis added) (constrning Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), modeled after, and substantially 
similar to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). 
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to 
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an] 
issue for trial [i±l there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117. 118 (1990) 
( emphasis added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit further explained 
the term "genuine" as being ··sufficiently open-ended to pcnrtit a rational factfinder to resolve 
the issue in favor either side." National Amusemencs, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 
( 1995). In the same case, it further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the 
outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Id. To put it another way, as the summary 
judgment standard is often explained by iaw professors, summary judgment is appropriate only if 
"reasonable minds cannot differ" as to the position offered by the moving party, based upon the 
evidence available in the record. 
Since, based upon the evidence currently in the record, a rational trier of fact could 
reasonably find: (1) that Friis was acting in a supervisory capacity over Appellant; (2) that a 
portion of the acts alleged took place within the scope and course of Friis' employment; (3) that 
adverse educational action \Vas taken against Appellant; (4) that Respondent NIC did not 
exercise reasonable care in preventing and correcting the sexually harassing behavior; and (5) 
that Appellant did not unreasonably fail to take advantage of preventive or corrective 
opportunities Respondents NIC is not entitled to a 'judgment as a matter of law." Therefore, the 
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District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment should be VACATED, and this matter 
REMANDED back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
2. Standard for Educational Discrimination Pursuant to the Idaho Human Ri£Yhts Act. 
Throughout the proceedings in this matter, Appellant has urged, and the Ninth Circuit 
agreed, R. at 154----58, that, due to differences in language bet\veen the Idaho Human Rights Act, 
Idaho Code § 67-5901, et seq. and Title IX of the Education Amendments to the Federal Civil 
Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., an educational discrimination claim pursuant to the Idaho 
Human Rights Act is more analogous to Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act with regard to 
the liability of an emp toyer educational institution. While the operative standard for educational 
discrimination pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act appears to be a matter of first impression 
for this Court, Appellant would urge this Court to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and, 
likewise, apply the Titie VII, rather than Title IX, standard with regard to such claims. 
Idaho Code § 67-5902(10) explicitly states that an educational institution "'includes an 
agent of an educational institution.'' (emphasis added). However, 20 U.S.C. § 168 l(c) (Title IX), 
unlike the IHRA or Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)), does not include agents \Vithin its definition 
of an educational institution. The inclusion of "agents" in the definition of ·'employer" under 
Title VII has been held to create liability pursuant to a respondeat superior theory. Miller's 1·. 
Afoxwell Int'!., Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the obvious purpose of this agent 
provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute.") ( emphasis added, 
internal quotations and citations removed). Given that the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon the 
l\lfaxwell case in its rejection of individual liability in that instance, Foster's v. Shore Club Lodge, 
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Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 925, 908 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1995), 3.;'1d given the inclusion of the agent 
provision in the IHRA definition of "educational institution," the provision was clearly intended 
to create respond eat superior liability on the part of the educational institution. Thus, the higher 
standard required for liability on the part of an employer educational institution pursuant to a 
Title LX claim, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998), is not 
required in the case of an Idaho Human Rights Act claim. 
Pursuant, then, to the analogous Title VII employment discrimination standard, 
Respondent NIC relies heavily upon the affirmative defense set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In Faragher, the United States Supreme Court sets forth an 
affirmative defense comprising of two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff ... unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm other.vise." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. It was on 
this "Faragher Defense" that the District Court, ultimately, granted Summary Judgment in 
Respondents' favor. Transcript at 9-13. 
3. There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact that NIC Did Not Exercise Reasonable Care In 
Preventing and Correcting Promptlv the Sexually Harassing Behavior and that Appellant Did 
Not Unreasonably Fail to Take Advantage of Anv Preventive or Corrective Opportunities 
Provided by NIC. 
a. Prevention and Prompt Correction Element. 
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On the first element of the Faragher, there remains a genuine issue of material fact, such 
that a rational trier of could reasonably find, that Respondent NIC did not exercise reasonable 
care in "preventing and correcting promptly" Friis' sexually harassing behavior. According to 
Appellant's Affidavit, despite being placed on notice of Respondent Friis' behavior, Respondent 
NIC failed to take any action. Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ir 11, R. at 237. Furthem1ore, NIC 
had been placed on notice regarding previous incidents involving other students, and, yet, failed 
to remove Friis from the classroom, provide additional supervision, or othenvise provide prevent 
the harassment at issue. Id. at ,rir 12-13; Affidavit of Rami Amaro, Exhibits A and B, R. at 245-
48; Affidavit of Michelle Cook, il 6, R. at 232. 
The previous incidents involving other students were handled as follows: On or about 
January 21, 2004, Respondent NIC had received a complaint regarding physical contact on the 
part of Friis with regard to a male student who felt that Friis had invaded the student's personal 
space, and made the student feel uncomfortable. Affidavit of Rami Amaro, Exhibit A (portion of 
Sexual Harassment Advisory Committee findings discussing the incident) R. at 245; Affidavit of 
Brenda Smith, ~j 14 (submitted by Respondent NIC in support of its .Motion for Summary 
Judgment), R. at 98; Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton, Exhibit E, page 5 and Exhibit G, page 2, R. 
at 57, 71. While the incident, apparently, raised sufficient concern on the part of Respondent 
NIC to require Friis to attend sensitivity training classes, id., NIC did no follo,v-up in order to 
ensure that such behavior was not continuing: No one was sent to Friis' classroom to observe or 
monitor his interactions with the students, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ,r 5, R. at 235; Affidavit 
of Michelle Cook, ,r 6, R. at 232, and NIC did not otherwise limit his contact with students 
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following the complaint. Additionally, at least one other member of Friis' class, Michelle Cook, 
had been subject to similar treatment as Appellant at the hands of Friis. Affidavit of Michelle 
Cook, fiif 3-5. R. at 232 .. 
Moreover, NIC staff observed Friis continue to engage m inappropriate touching of 
female students in April of 2005, while the investigation was pending. Affidavit of Rami Amaro, 
Exhibit B (NIC memoranda discussing the other "touching" incidents) R. at 247. In the office 
memoranda, the NIC staff members admit that Friis' actions may result in potential liability. Id. 
Yet NIC, once again, failed to take additional action. 
While Respondent is certainly free to argue this element of its affirmative defense at trial, 
the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, does not warrant a grant of 
Summary Judgment upon said Defense. As such, to the extent that the Dist1ict Coun relied upon 
this element of Faragher, the District Court's decision should be VACATED, and this matter 
REMANDED for further proceedings. 
b. Failure to Take Advantage of Anv Preventive or Corrective Opportunities 
Provided bv NIC. 
It is the second element of Faragher, failure to take advantage of preventive or corrective 
opportunities, which fom1ed the main basis of the District Cmd's decision to grant 
Reconsideration and Summary Judgment. Tr. at 14. In doing so, the District Court relies mainly 
upon three cases which held that a fear of retaliation was insufficient in order to render a delay in 
reporting harassment "reasonable:" Mukaida v. Haivaii, 159 F. Supp.2d 1211 (D. Hawaii 2001 ); 
Barrelt v. Applied Radient Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001); and Baldwin v. Blue 
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Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, (11 th Cir. 2007). ·while these cases do hold that a bare fear of 
retaliation, with nothing more do not render a delay in reporting the harassment "reasonable," the 
Federal courts have recognized that a credible threat of retaliation may excuse a delay in 
reporting sexual harassment. Weger v.City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 725 (8'h Cir. 2007); Reed v. 
/vfBNA AfarketingSystems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 3.5-36 (1 st Cir. 2003); Mota v. University of Texas 
Houston Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512, 525-26 (5 th Cir. 2001 ). Furthermore, the Courts 
which have discussed when a delay may be reasonable have wisely declined to adopt any "bright 
line test" as to the reasonableness of the extent of such a delay. Reed, 333 F. 3d at 35; l'vlota, 261 
F.Jd at 525. 
In the Mota case, the plaintiff therein, a professor at the defendant university, filed suit, 
claiming male-on-male sexual harassment from a senior professor by the name of Caffesse. Id. 
at 515-18. Notably, Mota did not file a formal complaint with the university until approximately 
eight months following the latest incident of harassment. Id. at 525. While Caffesse's threats of 
retaliation against Mota were explicit, rather than implicit, it should also be noted that Caffesse's 
"influence at the University" was another factor mentioned by the Fifth Circuit in its 
determination that the delay in reporting on the part of Mota was reasonable. Id. at 526. 
Initially, Appellant would urge this court to adopt a case-by-case approach with regard to 
the reasonableness set forth in the second prong of the Faragher defense. Cases involving 
sexual harassment are, very often, very factually driven, and, given the greater prominence such 
claims have received in the media in recent years, threats of retaliation are more likely to be 
implicit, rather than the explicit threats that were involved in the lvfota case. As such, the issue 
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of reasonableness should, with the exception of the most clear cases, be committed to the jury, 
which is in the best position to judge such matters based upon the evidence presented to it at 
trial. 
However, there still remains a genuine issue of material fact, such that a rational trier of 
could reasonably find, that the Appellant did not unreasonablv fail to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm othenvise." 
Initially, in addition to the actual notice regarding the harassment of the other students, 
Appellant did note her discomfort regarding Friis' behavior to NIC staff members, prior to filing 
the fom1al complaint. Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ii l l, R. at 237. Thus, a reasonable trier of 
fact could determine that this provided a sufficiently credible basis for Appellant to believe that 
further complaint would be futile. 
Furthem10rc, not only did Appellant fear that her grade may be affected by her response: 
to Friis' advances, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ~--'[ 6 and 8, R. at 235-36, there is sufficient 
evidence on the record for a rational trier of fact to find that Appellant perceived the change in 
her grade fron- an ·T' to an "F' was actual "adverse educational action," which, once taken, 
removed the potential of further adverse action. Moreover, similar fears on the part of other 
students, see Affidavit of Michel le Cook, 1 5 R. at 232, and that fact that Appellant believed that 
she would be required to take Friis' class a pre-requisite to graduation, Affidavit of Victoria 
Johnson, 1 7, R. at 235-36, \vould allow a rational trier of fact to draw a reasonable conclusion 
that Appellant's delay in filing the formal complaint was entirely reasonable, and more than just 
a simple, ungrounded, fear akin to those discussed in the cases relied upon by Respondent. 
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Vlhile the District Court states, in its decision, that: 
The defense also urged the Court to find that her mistake and [sic] belief 
that Mr. Friis had changed her grade from an I to an F \Vas the reason for her 
reporting. And the court does find that to be factually - certainly the inference to 
be drawn or the circumstances - under those circumstances that she mistakenly 
believed that he had changed her grade. It was only then that she reported that 
harassment. And the evidence is that she wanted her grade changed back to an I 
for the purposes of keeping up her financial aid. Not necessarily for the purpose 
of stopping Mr. Friis's behavior. 
Tr. at 13, a rational trier of fact could equally find that Appellant believed the 'T' to be adverse 
educational action, and that once the action was taken, the possibility, and the availability, of 
further retaliatory action was significantly diminished, thus allowing Appellant the freedom to 
file the formaJ complaint. b other words, once she received the ":!='", a reasonable '."actfindcr 
could determine that she had "nothing more to lose," and that the possibility of receiving a 
failing grade no longer posed a threat in the fitture. Given that such factual differences, for the 
purpose of summary judgment, must be weighed in favor of the non-moving party, the District 
Court was in error in granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. Therefore, the 
grant of summary judgment should be VACATED. and the matter REMANDED for further 
proceedings. Again, while Respondent NIC is perfectly free to argue its affirmative defense at 
trial, the weight of evidence on the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, 
does not create a lack of a genuine issue of material fact regarding said defense. 
Finally, it should also be noted that, with regard to adverse action, in the event that the 
harassment had acwall_v resulted in adverse action, under Faragher, said action would render the 
affirmative defense unavailable. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. In the instant case, a rational trier 
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of fact could reasonably find that the "I" grade being changed to an "F", as a direct and 
proximate result of Friis' conduct, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ,i 9 R. at 236, corlstituted 
adverse action, which would preclude Respondent NIC's invocation of the Affinnative Defense. 
However, even if this Court should find otherwise, at the very least, summary judgment was 
improper regarding the affirmative defense based upon its elements, as set forth above. Ergo, the 
District Court was in error in granting Respondent's Motion. 
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
As discussed above, Respondent's .\1otion for Summary Judgment was granted foilowing 
the District Court's grant of Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. R. at 316. The decision 
to grant or deny a request for reconsideration has generally been held to be in the discretion of 
the trial court. Antim v. Fred ,\;/eyer Stores, Inc., 251 P .3d 602, 610 (20 l l ). In reviewing a 
matter on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion s,andard, ·'the appellate court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: ( 1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether 
the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. In this case, the issue surrounding 
the District Court's grant of reconsideration is whether or not the court "acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistentiy with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it." Further, this Court has held that a Motion for Reconsideration generally 
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involves new or additional facts. Id.; Coeur d'Alene lvfining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North 
Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
In this case, the Motion for Reconsideration was not based upon '·new or additional 
facts;" rather, was is simply a re-briefing of the issues already presented before the District 
Court on Respondent's initial Motion for Summary Judgment, with specific attention given to the 
Faragher defense, following the District Court's denial of Summary Judgment. R. at 283-300. 
The cases and authorities, had Respondents wished to cite thereto, had been decided years prior 
to the District Court's decision, and there were no new or additional facts which came to light 
following the issuance of the District Court's initial Order denying summary judgment. Thus, 
the Motion for Reconsideration was simply an attempt to re-submit the matter, having had the 
benefit of the District Court's view of the remaining issues raised in the initial Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and was not necessary in order to serve the ends of "obtain[ing] a full and 
complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice 
done, as nearly as may be." Id. 
Given that there \Vere no new or additional facts, nor was there additional persuasive or 
binding authority decided by any court, between the District Court's initial decision denying 
summary judgment and Respondent's submission of its Motion for Reconsideration, the District 
Court did not act within the boundaries of such discretion or consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in 
granting Respondent's Motion, and, therefore, said grant of reconsideration should be 
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REVERSED, and the matter REMANDED, with the initial Order denying summary judgment 
re-instated. 
IV. CONCLCSION 
vVHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be 
REVERSED, VACATED, and the matter REMA:NTIED to the District Court with instrnctions 
pursuant to the legal and equitable principles set forth hereinabove. 
DATED this 22d day of June, 2011. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
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